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Religious Privilege to Discriminate as Religious 
Freedom: From Charitable Choice to Faith Based 
Initiatives to RFRA and FADA 
Marcia L. McCormick* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The movement for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Inter-
sex, and Asexual (LGBTQIA) rights has had three main themes since the civil 
rights era: freedom from criminalization of relationships and harassment by 
police; protection from discrimination in employment, housing, public ac-
commodations, and government services; and civil protections for familial re-
lationships, like the right to marry.1  Freedom from criminalization of inti-
mate relationships was won in 2003, when the Supreme Court held that the 
federal constitution protected same-sex intimate conduct and that states could 
not make that conduct criminal,2 and that decision accelerated the fight for 
civil protections for familial relationships.  In May 2015, the U.S. Supreme 
Court gave the LGBTQIA movement an important victory on that front, hold-
ing that the constitution protected the rights of same-sex couples to marry.3 
The fight for marriage equality was characterized by a political and legal 
tug-of-war at the federal and state level between advancements for LGBTQIA 
individuals, through legal challenges and legislation, and backlash, through 
legislation and state constitutional amendments.  That pattern remained after 
the Supreme Court’s marriage decision.  Since that case and earlier cases 
eroding limits on marriage, state legislatures began introducing legislation 
grounded rhetorically in religious freedom:4 new Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Acts in the states5 and the First Amendment Defense Act in Congress6 to 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Thanks to the Washburn Center for Law 
and Government and the Washburn Law Journal for inviting me to participate in this symposium.  I would 
like to thank Kelley Rhine for research assistance. 
 1. See generally ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL 
RIGHTS 1945-1990, AN ORAL HISTORY (1st ed. 1992). 
 2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 3. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 4. Monica Davey & Laurie Goodstein, Religion Laws Quickly Fall Into Retreat, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2015, at A1 (describing the rise of this rhetoric in 2009 and the increase in legislation after enactment of the 
Affordable Care Act, the Supreme Court’s decision finding the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional, 
and the Supreme Court’s decision recognizing marriage equality as a constitutional requirement). 
 5. E.g., S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2014); H.B. 1228, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 
2015); S.B. 101, 119th Gen Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015); H.B. 2453, 85th Leg., 2014 Sess. (Kan. 
2014). 
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allow people to continue to discriminate against LGBTQIA individuals.  
These join other efforts, not explicitly grounded in religion, but designed to 
discriminate against sexual minorities, like H.B. 2 in North Carolina.7 
While these legislative efforts may seem to be a new framing for reli-
gious freedom, this framing and privileging of religious actors by government 
has roots in the early 1980s, when President Reagan began urging churches 
and other faith-based groups to shoulder a greater burden of helping those in 
poverty, not leaving the effort to government to provide social services.8  Re-
ligious leaders did not then heed the call in large numbers, but that changed 
just over a decade later when books by a number of conservative thinkers 
gained influence with important political figures: George Bush, who, based on 
his own religious awakening, saw transformative potential in faith-based so-
cial services;9 Karl Rove, an influential political advisor to Bush;10 and Newt 
Gingrich, who became Speaker of the House in 1995, along with other Re-
publican lawmakers.11 
This Essay traces this history and the debates surrounding the use and 
expansion of faith-based organizations to deliver social services.  It begins by 
describing the current legislative efforts to allow discrimination against 
LGBTQIA individuals in the name of religious freedom and then travels back 
to the mid-90s to describe the rise of charitable choice and delivery of gov-
ernment services through faith-based organizations.  Throughout this history, 
LGBTQIA groups have voiced concerns about legitimizing discrimination, 
and policymakers have balanced their rights against the freedom of people 
with anti-LGBTQIA religious beliefs to engage in that discrimination.  These 
efforts have led directly to where we find ourselves today, debating legislation 
that allows for discrimination against LGBTQIA employees and consumers in 
the name of religious freedom. 
II.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSE ACT AND STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RESTORATION ACTS 
While the Supreme Court's final say in Obergefell v. Hodges,12 enshrin-
ing marriage equality in constitutional protection, seemed to many of us to be 
the end of that particular fight, it is clearly just one step in a broader push for 
equality, still bound up in advancement and backlash.  Within about six weeks 
 
 6. Religious Liberty and H.R. 2802, The First Amendment Defense Act (FADA), OVERSIGHT, 
https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/religious-liberty-and-h-r-2802-the-first-amendment-defense-act-fada/ 
[http://perma.cc/D8VN-GU97]. 
 7. H.B. 2, Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016). 
 8. Herbert H. Denton, Reagan Urges More Church Aid for Needy, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1982, at A3 
(describing a speech to a group of more than 100 religious leaders). 
 9. Jo Renee Formicola, The Good in the Faith-Based Initiative, in FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES AND THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 25, 25–27 (2003). 
 10. Id. at 27. 
 11. Id. at 30. 
 12. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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after the Supreme Court's decision, on June 17, 2015, Raul Labrador (R-
Idaho) and fifty-seven co-sponsors introduced the First Amendment Defense 
Act (FADA) in the House of Representatives;13 Mike Lee (R-Utah) intro-
duced the bill in the Senate with eighteen co-sponsors on the same day.14  
That legislation would have prevented any federal penalty to be imposed on a 
person, explicitly defined to include closely held corporations, because that 
“person believes or acts in accordance with a religious belief or moral convic-
tion that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one 
woman, or that sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage.”15  
In other words, the legislation would essentially have exempted any individu-
al from any federal rules or laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation or gender identity.16 
Proponents of FADA called it narrow,17 describing it as doing no more 
than making clear what the First Amendment already requires.  However, the 
language of the proposed legislation went significantly further than that.  
First, the Supreme Court held in 1990 that there is no religious exemption 
from generally applicable federal laws that do not target religious practices in 
particular.18  So, the First Amendment does not require a religious exemption 
from generally applicable anti-discrimination law.  Second, the scope of ac-
tions prohibited is broad.  The bill prevented any tax penalty, including loss of 
tax-exempt status, but also prohibited denial of any “grant, contract, subcon-
tract, cooperative agreement, loan, license, certification, accreditation, em-
ployment, or other similar position or status.”19  Further, it contained a catch-
all prohibition on withholding any benefit or “otherwise discriminat[ing] 
against such person.”20  Based on this language, a faith-based adoption ser-
vice that refused to serve married LGBTQIA couples would not lose federal 
funding.21  Similarly a federal supervisor who terminated an employee for 
 
 13. H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015). Another 115 representatives joined as co-sponsors after introduc-
tion of the bill. See H.R.2802–First Amendment Defense Act, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2802/cosponsors [http://perma.cc/E98J-8NVB].  All 
but one of the co-sponsors, Daniel Lipinski (Illinois), were Republicans.  Id. 
 14. S. 1598, 114th Cong. (2015).  Nineteen additional senators joined as co-sponsors after the bill’s 
introduction.  See S.1598–First Amendment Defense Act, CONGRESS.GOV,  
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1598/cosponsors  
[http://perma.cc/XJ4H-AGNB]. 
 15. H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. § 3(a) (2015). 
 16. Presumably, the legislation would also exempt any person who penalized a straight person for hav-
ing sex outside of marriage.  These kinds of penalties tend to fall more heavily on women because of social 
rules governing women’s sexuality and also because pregnancy, sometimes a consequence of sex, is visible 
evidence of sex.  There is no similar effect for men. 
 17. See Congressional Testimony on the First Amendment Defense Act, 114th Cong. 2 (July 12, 2016) 
(statement of Sen. Mike Lee) (describing the bill as “a very narrow and targeted legislative response 
to . . . unanswered questions” about the effect of Obergefell on tax exemptions for institutions that do not 
recognize same sex marriages) (on file with author). 
 18. Emp’t Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990). 
 19. First Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802 § 3(b). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform on Religious Freedom 
& the First Amendment Defense Act, 114th Cong. 7–8 (July 12, 2016) (statement of Kristin K. Waggoner, 
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marrying a same sex partner—or who terminated an employee the supervisor 
believed to have had sex outside of a heterosexual marriage—could not be 
disciplined.  One of those who testified in favor of the legislation also sug-
gested that the statutory language would prohibit not just penalties motivated 
by the person's religious beliefs in the immorality of same-sex marriage, but 
also neutral practices that would have a negative effect on people or organiza-
tions that oppose same sex marriage—in other words, disparate impact.22 
FADA was framed as a bill to enhance religious freedom, but it privi-
leged one set of religious views over others and over rights of LGBTQIA in-
dividuals, unmarried couples, and single unmarried mothers, as well. Not all 
religions view same sex marriage as inconsistent with their beliefs, yet the bill 
did not protect those who support same sex marriage from penalties. Because 
the bill privileged one set of beliefs over others and over the rights of others to 
be free from discrimination, the bill raised serious Establishment Clause con-
cerns. 
Legislatures at the state level also ramped up initiatives grounded in reli-
gious freedom or conscience.  Indiana was one of the first states to introduce 
religious freedom legislation in reaction to the marriage cases.23  The bill fol-
lowed the language of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, requir-
ing any government action to be the least restrictive means of furthering a 
compelling government interest.24  It explicitly included for-profit corpora-
tions, though, as protected under the act and allowed people to claim protec-
tions in lawsuits brought by private individuals.25  In addition, some propo-
nents of the legislation saw it as a way to protect small companies from 
having to provide services to gay couples getting married.26  That law passed, 
but because of pressure from businesses and civil rights groups, the law was 
amended to make clear that it did not allow discrimination against LGBTQIA 
individuals.27  Nearly identical legislation was passed in Arkansas,28 but it 
was narrowed to mirror the federal RFRA.29 
 
Senior Counsel, Alliance Defending Freedom). 
 22. Id. at 6 n.13. 
 23. Davey & Goodstein, supra note 4.  Arizona may actually have been the first to introduce and enact 
religious freedom provisions like those enacted in Indiana.  See S.D. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2014).  The legislation was vetoed, however, by Governor Jan Brewer.  Catherine E. Shoichet & Halimah 
Abdullah, Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes Controversial Anti-Gay Bill, SB 1062, CNN (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/26/politics/arizona-brewer-bill/  
[http://perma.cc/7W42-TDVZ]. 
 24. Compare S.D. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 10 (Ind. 2015), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1 (2012). 
 25. S.D. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. §§ 6, 7(3), 9 (Ind. 2015). 
 26. Davey & Goodstein, supra note 4. 
 27. Monica Davey, Campbell Robertson, & Richard Pérez-Peña, Indiana and Arkansas Revise Rights 
Bills, Seeking to Remove Divisive Parts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2015, at A12. 
 28. H.B. 1228, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); see also Campbell Robertson & Richard 
Pérez-Peña, Bills on ‘Religious Freedom’ Upset Capitols in Arkansas and Indiana, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2015, 
at A1. 
 29. Davey, Robertson & Pérez-Peña, supra note 27. 
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Other states also acted to allow a religious freedom to oppose marriage 
equality.  In Louisiana, legislators introduced the Marriage and Conscience 
Act, which had text nearly identical to FADA's, although the original lan-
guage was more neutral, protecting people who “act[] in accordance with a 
religious belief or moral conviction about the institution of marriage.”30  The 
bill was amended to limit its scope to convictions “that marriage should be 
recognized as the union of one man and one woman.”31  That legislation did 
not pass, but then-Governor Jindal a supporter of the legislation,32 signed an 
executive order that embodied the same limits as the failed legislation, alt-
hough the executive order also provided that the religious “principle [should] 
not be construed to authorize any act of discrimination.”33 
The most sweeping bill was enacted by Mississippi.  The Mississippi 
Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act mir-
rors FADA, but adds an additional provision: “Male (man) or female (wom-
an) refer to an individual's immutable biological sex as objectively determined 
by anatomy and genetics at time of birth.”34  That bill passed, and the Gover-
nor signed it into law in April 2016; it was to go into effect July 1, 2016.35  
The law was challenged and enjoined before it could go into effect.36  The 
district court held that the law violated the Establishment Clause because it 
preferred one set of religious tenets over others and because the exemption it 
provided would injure people who did not follow those tenets.37  The case is 
currently before the Fifth Circuit on expedited appeal.38 
III.  CHARITABLE CHOICE AND FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES 
These provisions, using the language of religious freedom to privilege 
religion in the marketplace, have deep roots, stretching back, arguably to 
Ronald Reagan's exhortation to churches to engage in more charitable work.  
Reagan may have urged faith-based organizations to engage in more social-
service delivery, but the federal policy shift to actively incorporate faith-based 
 
 30. H.D. 707, 2015 Reg. Sess., § 5245(A) (La. 2015). 
 31. House Floor Amendments, LA. STATE LEGIS.,  
https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=93852 [http://perma.cc/MEN5-TTT8]; House Com-
mittee Amendments, LA. STATE LEGIS.,  
https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=948360 [http://perma.cc/S9JJ-Y3TP]. 
 32. See Bobby Jindal, Editorial, Holding Firm Against Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2015, at 
A27. 
 33. Louisiana Marriage and Conscience Order, Exec. Order No. BJ 2015-8 (La.), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2083965/louisiana-marriage-and-conscience-order.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Y93D-7ATC]; see Dominic Holden, Gov. Jindal Issues Order on Religious Freedom and 
Same-Sex Marriage, BUZZFEED (May 20, 2015), https://www.buzzfeed.com/dominicholden/gov-jindal-
issues-order-on-religious-freedom-and-same-sex-ma?utm_term=.ofQOYWMl6#.ixg8LwMBX 
[http://perma.cc/M7Q8-LWCN]. 
 34. 2016 Miss. Laws ch. 334 (H.B. 1523). 
 35. Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 693 (S.D. Miss. 2016). 
 36. Id. at 723–24. 
 37. Id. at 716–22. 
 38. See Barber v. Bryant, 833 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 2016) (denying stay pending appeal). 
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delivery of social services did not begin in earnest until the mid-1990s when 
attitudes about the separation of church and state shifted among policymakers.  
Four advocates, in particular, contributed to this shift.39 
Marvin Olasky, a professor of journalism and public policy, has written 
many books on U.S. society and social problems.  His most well-known book, 
The Tragedy of American Compassion was published in 199240 and greatly 
influenced Republican lawmakers at the time.  In a foreword to the book that 
summarized Olasky's theory of “compassionate conservatism,” then-Governor 
George W. Bush praised Olasky as “the first to show brilliantly how our na-
tion's history is one of compassion” that can only be effectively delivered by 
personal contact.41  Bush crystalized Olasky's view by saying: 
Conservatism must be the creed of hope.  The creed that promotes social pro-
gress through individual change . . . .  Government can do certain things very 
well, but it cannot put hope in our hearts or a sense of purpose in our lives.  That 
requires churches and synagogues and mosques and charities.  A truly compas-
sionate government is one that rallies these armies of compassion and provides 
an environment in which they can thrive.42 
Then-Governor and later President Bush was not alone in adopting 
Olasky's arguments: Newt Gingrich, who became the first Republican Speak-
er of the House in forty years in 1995, found Olasky's book so important that 
he gave copies to all of the incoming Republican representatives.43 
In The Tragedy of American Compassion, Olasky argued that private in-
dividuals and organizations, particularly Christian churches, have a responsi-
bility to care for the poor.44  He further contended that challenging personal 
and spiritual help, a common way to support the poor until the 1930s, was 
more effective at helping the poor than the government welfare programs of 
recent decades.45  Olasky viewed government programs as ineffective be-
cause those programs, staffed by professionals, are disconnected from the 
poor.46  He saw private charity as more effective because he saw it as having 
the power to change lives through a personal connection between giver and 
recipient.  This relationship was transformative for both the helper and the re-
cipient of help. 
A second influential conservative was Myron Magnet, a journalist and 
historian.  Magnet also wrote a book in the early 1990s, The Dream and the 
Nightmare: The Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass.47  In that book, Magnet ar-
 
 39. Formicola, supra note 9, at 27–41. 
 40. See generally MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992). 
 41. George W. Bush, Forward, in MARVIN OLASKY, COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM xi (2000). 
 42. Id. at xi–xii. 
 43. Formicola, supra note 9, at 30. 
 44. OLASKY, supra note 40. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE: THE SIXTIES’ LEGACY TO THE 
UNDERCLASS (1993). 
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gued the cultural change the U.S. underwent during the 1960s, driven by lib-
eral elites, created an entrenched underclass because those elites emphasized 
the wrong values.  They failed to emphasize deferral of gratification, sobriety, 
thrift, and hard work, which were needed to give people both skills and hope 
to lift themselves out of poverty.48 
A third influential conservative was John Dilulio, a criminologist and 
political scientist. Dilulio, with William J. Bennet and John P. Walters, wrote 
Body Count, a book warning of a coming wave of rampant crime.49  The au-
thors described kids with no respect for human life, no sense of the future, 
who act on impulse, and they predicted that juvenile crime would triple by 
2010 as a consequence of this moral poverty.50  The focus was on crime as a 
moral problem, and the authors urged that this moral problem ought to have a 
moral solution and one solution was the moral authority of the church.51  
Dilulio regretted the effects of his work by 2001 when he was directing the 
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.52  His work 
had sensationalized juvenile crime and provided cover for partisan politics 
that were especially punitive.53  Shortly after the book was published, Dilulio 
had what he described as a religious epiphany during Mass on Palm Sunday in 
1996 that caused him to shift his focus from prison to prevention of this moral 
poverty through religious ministry to juveniles and their families, to help 
“bring caring, responsible adults to wrap their arms around these kids.”54 
The fourth influential figure was Stephen Goldsmith, Mayor of Indian-
apolis from 1992-2000.  Goldsmith created what he called the Front Porch Al-
liance, an initiative to partner faith-based and community groups with the city 
to deliver social services and revitalize neighborhoods.  Goldsmith wrote of 
his success in The Twenty-First Century City: Resurrecting Urban America.55  
These partnerships were successful, Goldsmith has argued, because faith-
based organizations tend to be closely tied to neighborhoods and because ur-
ban strength is built on values.56  Faith-based organizations are particularly 
good at shaping values because they can “teach our youth about citizenship, 
civility, charity, and a host of other values,” and partnering them with gov-
 
 48. Id. at 38. 
 49. See generally WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DILULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT: 
MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS (1996). 
 50. Id. at 26. 
 51. Id.  Dilulio also coined the term “super-predators” to describe the juveniles.  John J. Dilulio, Jr., 
The Coming of the Super-Predators, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/the-coming-of-the-super-predators/article/8160 [http://perma.cc/P7E9-
QFL9]. 
 52. Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young “Superpredators,” Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally STEPHEN GOLDSMITH, THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CITY: RESURRECTING URBAN 
AMERICA (1997). 
 56. Stephen Goldsmith, Having Faith in Our Neighborhoods: The Front Porch Alliance, in WHAT’S 
GOD GOT TO DO WITH THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 72, 76–78 (E.J. Dionne & John J. Dilulio, Jr. eds., 2000). 
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ernment will increase their capacity to do so.57 
All four advanced a common theme that relying on government to pro-
vide social services—or social goods like crime prevention—was both inef-
fective and costly.  The solution to both problems (effectiveness and cost) was 
to increase the role of religion in people's lives.  The transformative power of 
religion could provide the internal qualities that individual poor people lacked 
so that they could successfully move themselves out of poverty.  And reli-
gious organizations, who had been doing good with little funding for a long 
time, could do it for less.58  As an outgrowth of this view, a number of faith-
based initiatives were created in the late 1990s.59 
Government partnering with religious organizations happened at the fed-
eral level at about the same time and through the same influence as part of 
welfare reform in 1996.  Senator John Ashcroft proposed that “charitable 
choice” be part of welfare reform efforts.60  He introduced what became sec-
tion 104 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act, which increased opportunities for religious organizations to partner with 
government to provide social services to the maximum extent allowed by the 
First Amendment.61  The extension of participation was framed as “nondis-
crimination against religious organizations” by the assistance programs.62  
The type of services that religious organizations could apply to provide in-
cluded things like job training, mentoring programs, job research, high school 
equivalency classes, English as a second language classes, child care, nutri-
tion and food-budgeting classes, before- and after-school programs, and adult 
day care.63 
There were some limits put into the law to protect the free exercise of re-
ligion by the organizations that were eligible for funds.  The law stated that 
religious organizations retained their independence from federal, state, and 
local governments and retained control over the “definition, development, 
practice, and expression of [their] religious beliefs.”64  Additionally, the reli-
gious organization was not required to alter its form of internal governance or 
remove religious symbols to participate.65 
 
 57. Id. at 78. 
 58. See id. at 77. 
 59. See Formicola, supra note 9, at 26, 35–36, 45–47.  The City of Indianapolis, the State of New Jer-
sey, and the State of Texas were the governments to do so.  Id. 
 60. Mary Segers, Introduction: President Bush’s Faith Based Initiative, in FAITH BASED INITIATIVES 
AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 1, 6. 
 61. Id.; see Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 
§ 104(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2162 (1996); Oliver Thomas, Charitable Choice/Faith-Based Initiatives, NEWSEUM 
INST. (June 2009), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-
religion/establishment-clause-overview/charitable-choicefaith-based-initiatives/ [http://perma.cc/9UUM-
2PZJ]. 
 62. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104(c), 110 Stat. at 2162. 
 63. Thomas, supra note 61. 
 64. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104(d)(1), 110 Stat. at 2162. 
 65. Id. § 104(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 2162. 
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There were also limits designed to protect free exercise rights of benefi-
ciaries.  The type of limits on the religious organization depended in part on 
the type of funding it received.  If the organization received a direct grant or 
contract, it had to provide a strictly nonreligious program.  Government funds 
could not be used for worship, sectarian instruction, or proselytizing.66  If, 
however, the religious organization received only indirect funding—such as 
child-care vouchers—the limitations on worship, sectarian instruction, and 
proselytizing did not apply.67  All religious organizations that received gov-
ernment funding—either directly or indirectly—had to provide services in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.  In other words, religious organizations could not 
deny funded services to anyone on the basis of race, religion, gender, national 
origin, or the recipient’s refusal to participate in a religious activity.68  And if 
a recipient objected, the government had to provide a secular alternative.69 
One last class of limit in the law was put in place to accommodate reli-
gious organizations.  The law made clear that if a religious organization 
would be exempt from application of the religious discrimination provisions 
in Title VII, this provision would not affect that exemption.70  Title VII pro-
vides that it will not apply “to a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a par-
ticular religion.”71  Thus, a religious institution can discriminate on the basis 
of religion, although not on the basis of race, sex, color, or national origin.  
Title VII further provides, however, that “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all as-
pects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief . . . .”72  Thus a 
religious employer can require that an employee’s behavior comport with re-
ligious tenets.73 
 
 66. Id. § 104(j), 110 Stat. at 2163. 
 67. See id. (limiting application to those who receive direct grants or contracts). 
 68. Id. § 104(g), 110 Stat. at 2163. 
 69. Id. § 104(e)(2), 110 Stat. at 2162–63. 
 70. Id. § 104(f), 110 Stat. at 2163. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012).  Title VII also allows any employer to discriminate on the basis of 
religion if religion is “a bona fide occupational qualification for the position in question,” and specifically 
allows religious schools to hire only members of particular religions.  Id. § 2000e-2(e)(2). 
 72. Id. § 2000e(j).  The focus of this provision is on discrimination against an employee because of the 
employee’s religious practices, rather than defining what religion means for a religious employer, necessarily.  
The provision continues after the quoted language about religious practices with a caveat “unless an employ-
er demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s 
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”  Still, 
because this provision is part of the definition of what religion means for purposes of Title VII, and because 
the provision preserves a significant amount of employer discretion through the undue hardship language, 
protection of employer prerogatives based on the employer’s religion seems likely. 
 73. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) (holding that the Mormon 
Church could fire employees for not meeting the “worthiness requirements” for membership in the church); 
Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996) (religious school can terminate a teacher for 
having extramarital sex as long as it terminates men for the same reason); cf. Hamilton v. Southland Christian 
Sch., 680 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012) (while religious school can terminate an employee for having premarital 
sex, it cannot terminate her for being pregnant); Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 566 F. 
Supp. 2d 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that religious school could terminate a teacher who became pregnant 
for having sex outside of marriage but not for being pregnant; if men were also terminated for having sex 
outside of marriage, there would be no sex or pregnancy discrimination); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 
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More limitations were placed on faith-based initiatives in New Jersey.  
Funded programs had to be separately incorporated 501(c)(3) organization 
with their own board of directors, bylaws, records, and budget.74  Additional-
ly, those entities cannot proselytize, and they must abide by state and federal 
antidiscrimination laws.75 
At the same time that charitable choice was becoming official federal 
policy and faith-based initiatives were put in place in Indianapolis and New 
Jersey, George W. Bush implemented a faith-based initiative in Texas.76  
Bush then made instituting a broad faith-based initiative at the federal level a 
main part of his campaign for President.77  In early 2001, newly elected Pres-
ident Bush created the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives by 
executive order to expand the opportunities for government to partner with 
religious organizations in many more contexts than already allowed under the 
charitable choice provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act.78  That order exempted religious organization par-
ticipants from rules that prohibit faith-based employment discrimination.79  
That order, like for Title VII, was understood to allow religious organizations 
to discriminate on the basis not only of the religion of an employee or appli-
cant but also on the basis of behavior that conflicts with the organization's re-
ligious beliefs.80  President Bush made John Dilulio the director of the of-
fice.81 
IV.  THE CLASH BETWEEN RELIGION AND RIGHTS TO BE FREE FROM 
DISCRIMINATION 
President Bush's faith-based initiative was controversial from the start.  
Critics on the right were concerned that their missions would be compromised 
by limits put on proselytizing and wanted more direct financial support.82  
Many religious leaders did not feel strongly positive about the faith-based ini-
 
F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same). 
 74. Formicola, supra note 9, at 46, 47, 49–50. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 26. 
 77. Id. at 41. 
 78. See Exec. Order No. 13198, 66 Fed Reg. 8497 (Jan. 29, 2001); Exec. Order No. 13199, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001). 
 79. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE QUIET REVOLUTION: THE PRESIDENT’S FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY 
INITIATIVE: A SEVEN-YEAR PROGRESS REPORT 29–30 (Feb. 2008), 
http://www.socialpolicyandreligion.org/docs/policy/TheQuietRevolutionFinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/M6X2-
XRHT]. 
 80. See Constitutional Role of Faith-Based Orgs. in Competition for Fed. Soc. Serv. Funds, Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (prepared 
statement of Rabbi David N. Saperstein),  
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju72981.000/hju72981_0f.htm [http://perma.cc/TV6N-
263Q]; Formicola, supra note 9, at 43. 
 81. Formicola, supra note 9, at 40. 
 82. Id. at 43–44; Jo Renee Formicola & Mary Segers, The Ugly Politics of the Faith-Based Initiative, 
in FAITH BASED INITIATIVES IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 115, 145–47. 
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tiatives.83  At the same time, while the public generally supported funding 
charitable religious organizations, fewer people supported funding Catholic 
churches, and a bare majority supported funds going to Evangelical or Mor-
mon churches.84  There was significantly less support for funds going to Mus-
lim mosques or Buddhist Temples, and strong opposition to funding going to 
smaller religions, like the Nation of Islam or Scientology.85  Critics on the left 
were worried about the use of public funds for religious purposes and were 
especially worried that federal funds would be used to discriminate in hir-
ing—especially against LGBTQIA individuals.86 
A few months after the executive orders were signed, the Community 
Solutions Act was introduced in Congress, seeking to advance the President's 
faith-based initiative.87  That legislation would have provided tax incentives 
for donating to religious organizations that provided social services, made it 
easier for religious charitable organizations to get 501(c)(3) status, and pro-
vided funding to support religious provision of social services in a number of 
ways.88  In line with the employment discrimination exemptions of the execu-
tive orders, section 201 of the Community Solutions Act stated: “a religious 
organization that provides assistance under a [federally-funded] program may, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law[, including the program’s govern-
ing statute], require that its employees adhere to the religious practices of the 
organization.”89 
Employment discrimination against LGBTQIA individuals was central 
to the controversy over faith-based initiatives.  In the summer of 2001, the 
Salvation Army asked the White House to support a hiring exemption that 
would explicitly allow it to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity.90  On the other side of the issue, an amendment was proposed 
by a Republican Representative that would have removed Title VII’s exemp-
tion for religious organizations for any entity that accepted federal funds 
through the program.91  The controversy over the exemption that existed in 
the proposed legislation, along with the request by the Salvation Army, exist-
ed in the House, but it was so strong in the Senate that the bill was clearly not 
going to succeed.92 
Although the bill passed the House quickly,93 by the end of the summer 
 
 83. Segers, supra note 60, at 7–9; see also Formicola & Segers, supra note 82, at 115, 144. 
 84. Paul Weber, The Bad in the Faith-Based Initiative, in FAITH BASED INITIATIVES IN THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 63, 66. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Formicola, supra note 9, at 44. 
 87. H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 592, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 88. Formicola & Segers, supra note 82. 
 89. H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201; see also Formicola & Segers, supra note 82, at 139. 
 90. See Formicola & Segers, supra note 82, at 134. 
 91. Id. at 147. 
 92. See id. at 141–43. 
 93. Id. at 140. 
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of 2001, it became clear that the Community Solutions Act would not pass,94 
so the Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment Act was introduced to focus 
on incentives to increase charitable giving.95  That legislation prohibited reli-
gious organizations from discriminating in hiring.96  That bill died in Novem-
ber of 2002.97  After that, President Bush signed another executive order, ex-
tending the exemption from hiring discrimination rules to government 
contractors that were religious entities.98  This executive order was extremely 
contentious, in part because it seemed a reversal of policy that had been in 
place since 1941 that recipients of federal funds not be allowed to discrimi-
nate.99  If the government would violate the Constitution and federal statutes 
by discriminating, private entities should be held to the same standard when 
they are funded by federal tax dollars.  The executive order, along with others 
that expanded faith-based partnerships, was also controversial because it was 
lawmaking through executive action, problematic in separation of powers 
terms.100 
When President Obama took office, he reinvigorated faith-based initia-
tives by creating a new Office for Faith-Based Programs and Neighborhood 
Partnerships.101  In this expansion, President Obama retained the exemption 
from nondiscrimination rules in the face of opposition and despite campaign 
promises to end it.102  He did, however, prohibit discrimination against 
LGBTQIA individuals by federal contractors.103 
While support for greater involvement of religious organizations in pub-
lic life was growing and fostering the movement for faith-based initiatives, 
support for explicit protection for LGBTQIA workers was also growing.  Its 
roots start a bit earlier.  After Title VII, the first antidiscrimination legislation 
that would have explicitly covered sexual minorities was the Equality Act  of 
1974.  It would have added sex, sexual orientation and marital status to Titles 
II, III, and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and sexual orientation and mar-
ital status to Titles IV, VII, and VIII of that statute and to Title IX of the Edu-
 
 94. Id. at 149. 
 95. S. 1924, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 96. Formicola & Segers, supra note 82, at 137. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Executive Order No. 13279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141 (Dec. 12, 2002). 
 99. Formicola & Segers, supra note 82, at 151. 
 100. Id. at 151–52. 
 101. Exec. Order No. 13498, 3 C.F.R. § 13498 (2009); Jeff Zeleny, Obama Expands Faith-Based Pro-
grams, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2009), https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/obama-calls-for-
expansion-of-faith-program/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/38SB-68BA]. 
 102. Zeleny, supra note 101; Devin Dwyer, Faith -Based Debate: Obama Signs Order on Funds for 
Churches, ABC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-obama-executive-order-
faith-based-initiative-church/story?id=12180146 [http://perma.cc/2U6L-UQNC] (describing the President as 
silent on the issue); Lauren Markoe, Critics Push Obama to Change Faith-Based Hiring Rules, USATODAY 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2011-06-22-obama-religion-hiring_n.htm 
[http://perma.cc/9435-Z74M]. 
 103. Exec. Order No. 13672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 23, 2014). 
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cation Amendments of 1972.104  There was no exception in that legislation 
for religious organizations.  That legislation was not passed, and similar legis-
lation was not introduced in Congress again for more than twenty years.  
When antidiscrimination legislation was introduced in 1994, as the Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), the bill prohibited discrimination in 
employment on the basis of sexual orientation and exempted religious non-
profit organizations, but not for-profit entities, from coverage.105 
ENDA was reintroduced in substantially the same form in every session 
of Congress but one between then and 2013 with few substantial changes.  In 
2007, there were two substantial changes.  First, gender identity was added to 
the bill, and that continued to be part of proposed legislation in the next two 
sessions of Congress.106  Second, the bill expanded the religious exemption; it 
removed the limit on for-profit activities and added an individual exemption 
for any employee whose primary duties involved teaching religious beliefs, 
even if the organization they worked for was not a religious organization, and 
express permission for religious organizations to require any employees or 
applicants to conform to religious tenets.107  That provision did not appear in 
later-introduced versions; the proposed legislation simply referred back to the 
exemption in Title VII.  ENDA has never passed and is no longer supported 
by the LGBTQIA community because of the broad exemption for religious 
organizations, especially after the Supreme Court held in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc.108 that closely held corporations had religious rights pro-
tected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.109 
IV.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Inclusion of religious organizations in the delivery of social services was 
framed initially as an effort to stop discriminating on the basis of religion and 
included protections for beneficiaries to avoid a clash with the right to be free 
from the religion of the organizations providing service.  Rights of workers, 
however, gave way, and the controversy over that issue remained a large ob-
stacle to the program.  During the same time period, ENDA most explicitly 
focused on the perceived clash between rights of LGBTQIA individuals to be 
free from discrimination and rights of religious persons to discriminate 
 
 104. H.R. 14752, 93rd Cong. (2d Sess. 1974). 
 105. S. 2238, 103d Cong. (2d Sess. 1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
but limiting the anti-discrimination obligations of employers and exempting religious organizations); H.R. 
4636, 103d Cong. (1994) (same); see S. 2238 § 7(b) (“This Act shall apply to a religious organization’s for-
profit activities.”); H.R. 4635, § 7(b) (same). 
 106. H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). 
 107. Id. 
 108. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 109. Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw Support of ENDA After Hobby Lobby Decision, WASH. 
POST (July 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-group-
withdrawing-support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobby-decision/?utm_term=.af0061b05c00 
[http://perma.cc/9KHC-7A3K]. 
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against LGBTQIA individuals. And pressure from religious groups was grow-
ing.  While health care reform was being debated early in President Obama's 
term, states were extending marriage to same-sex couples, and pressure was 
growing to pass ENDA, religious leaders gathered and issued the Manhattan 
Declaration, affirming that they would resist any law that could be used to 
compel them to be complicit in abortion or to recognize the legitimacy of 
same sex relationships.110  The Declaration was explicitly an effort to rejuve-
nate the political alliance of conservative Catholics and Evangelicals that 
dominated the religious debate during the administration of President George 
W. Bush. 
This clash of rights is currently coming to a head within Title VII.  Title 
VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex has been interpreted by 
the EEOC as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity and 
sexual orientation.  A number of courts have agreed. 
Religious organizations may have lost the chance they had to be exempt 
from nondiscrimination requirements when ENDA failed to pass.  As it 
stands, it is unlikely that many religious organizations would satisfy Title 
VII’s exemption, and for-profit institutions would likely be completely out of 
luck.  In order to qualify for Title VII’s exemption, an institution's “purpose 
and character [must be] primarily religious.”111  A multi-factor test is applied, 
with no one factor dispositive.  Significant factors that courts have considered 
to determine whether an employer is a religious organization for purposes of 
Title VII include: whether the entity is a non-profit, whether its day-to-day 
operations are religious (e.g., are the services the entity performs, the product 
it produces, or the educational curriculum it provides directed toward propa-
gation of the religion?); whether the entity’s articles of incorporation or other 
pertinent documents state a religious purpose; whether it is owned, affiliated 
with or financially supported by a formally religious entity such as a church or 
other religious organization; whether a formally religious entity participates in 
the management, for instance by having representatives on the board of trus-
tees; whether the entity holds itself out to the public as secular or sectarian; 
whether the entity regularly includes prayer or other forms of worship in its 
activities; whether it includes religious instruction in its curriculum, to the ex-
tent it is an educational institution; and whether its membership is made up of 
coreligionists.112 
Without protection in Title VII, it is likely that there will be a push for 
federal legislation like Mississippi’s.  Alternatively, religious organizations 
may urge courts to interpret Title VII’s exemption more broadly than they 
have in the past, in Hobby-Lobby like fashion.  Although the operative lan-
 
 110. Laurie Goodstein, Christian Leaders Unite on Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A22. 
 111. EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 112. Id. 
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guage in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was different from that in Ti-
tle VII, providing that “persons” were protected, which allowed the Court to 
include corporations, Title VII’s “religious corporation” might be interpreted 
in a similar fashion.  We will have to wait and see what develops.  Whatever 
happens, it is up to Congress and the courts. 
 
